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A Case for Disastrous Party Politics in Peru
Abstract
The commemoration of 200 years of Peruvian independence brings the question if the republic is really
free and sovereign. Even though Peru is formally a democracy, it is weak and not yet consolidated.
Satisfaction with democracy is low, and many analysts claim that it already died in the 1990s. In a narrow
sense, Peruvian democracy is in danger because of the personalistic nature of the political parties. This
study defends the argument that parties in Peru are weak. Specifically, it focuses on the shift from
traditional to proto-parties. Traditional parties failed in their political role, and, therefore, new anti-elite and
personalistic vehicles started to gain power in politics. The main hypothesis is that the parties are weak
because they are not properly organized, and have been controlled by self-interested individuals.
Specifically, there is an exploration of the role and development of diverse groups of parties in the various
presidential elections from 1980 to 2021. There is also a close look at urbanization rates per party, as
parties represent a wide variety of individuals, and it is crucial to understand where the parties get their
votes from. By knowing the success or failure of specific parties, their presence or absence in sociopolitical scenarios, their demographic focus, their presidential journey through the years, and their current
situation, this paper shows that Peruvian parties are weak and in need of reform. Introduction
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A Case for Disastrous Party Politics in Peru
Carlo Chávez Linares
Abstract
The commemoration of 200 years of Peruvian independence brings the question if the
republic is really free and sovereign. Even though Peru is formally a democracy, it is weak and
not yet consolidated. Satisfaction with democracy is low, and many analysts claim that it already
died in the 1990s. In a narrow sense, Peruvian democracy is in danger because of the
personalistic nature of the political parties. This study defends the argument that parties in Peru
are weak. Specifically, it focuses on the shift from traditional to proto-parties. Traditional
parties failed in their political role, and, therefore, new anti-elite and personalistic vehicles
started to gain power in politics. The main hypothesis is that the parties are weak because they
are not properly organized, and have been controlled by self-interested individuals. Specifically,
there is an exploration of the role and development of diverse groups of parties in the various
presidential elections from 1980 to 2021. There is also a close look at urbanization rates per
party, as parties represent a wide variety of individuals, and it is crucial to understand where
the parties get their votes from. By knowing the success or failure of specific parties, their
presence or absence in socio-political scenarios, their demographic focus, their presidential
journey through the years, and their current situation, this paper shows that Peruvian parties
are weak and in need of reform.
Introduction
Peru has been living in a decent democratic experience since 2001, with five consecutive
participatory, fair, and peaceful elections. However, Peruvian democracy is not yet consolidated,
and hardly will be in the next few years. Peruvian citizens’ average satisfaction with democracy
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between 1996 and 2010 is 17%, which is way below the general Latin American average (35%)
(Latinobarometro, 2010, p.47). Furthermore, Cheibub (2007) and Golder (2004) consider Peru’s
democracy to have ended somewhere between 1989 and 1990 (Maeda, 2010).
This brings the question: Is Peruvian democracy in danger? And this gives light to the
main argument: Peruvian democracy is in danger because the political parties are
“agglomerations of individual and group interests more than solid and representative parties.”
(Vargas, 2020, p.1). Democracy without a solid party system is exposed to several dangers that
could lead to democratic breakdown. As E.E. Schattschneider has said: “democracy is
unthinkable without parties.” (Levitsky, 1999, p.6; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003, p.1). This is the
case because parties provide various functions in a democracy, such as: links, representation,
information on candidates, discipline, and accountability to democratic institutions.
This study defends the argument that political parties in Peru are weak, and focuses on
the shift from traditional to proto-parties. Since 2000, support for traditional political parties has
thoroughly collapsed in Peru, paving the way for the rise of personalist leaderships. As a result,
new personalistic vehicles, proto-parties, anti-elite, and left-wing groups started to gain power.
The main hypothesis is that the parties are weak because they are not properly
organized, and have been controlled by self-interest individuals. This egoism is very dangerous
for democracy because, as Simón Bolívar has said: “the continuation of the authority of the
same individual has often been the end of democratic governments.” (Oppenheimer, 2010,
p.39). In this paper, the role of parties in Peru and Latin America is explored, therefore showing
the important factors that lead either to party breakdown or success. There is also a study on the
diverse groups of parties that participated in the presidential elections from 1980 to 2021.
Julio Cotler argues that “the reading of history is indispensable to an understanding of
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the politics of the present.” (Crabtree, 2010, p.361). Therefore, a historical chronology is also
included in this paper, which helps understand why parties have the problems they currently
face. This analysis as well manifests why new anti-system options such as proto-parties came
into the scene. In the last Peruvian election (2021), there were barely any traditional parties in
the game, and most parties were personalistic vehicles with very few years of existence in the
political field.
This paper is organized into five sections: a literature review on parties, first empirical
analysis (number of votes vs. time in years), historical chronology (from 1821 to 2021), second
empirical analysis (urbanization level vs. political party), and conclusions, in which the main
thesis is answered, the limitations are explained, and alternative future research are introduced.
By taking a look at the success or failure of specific parties, their presence or absence in
socio-political scenarios, their demographic focus, their presidential journey through the years,
and their current situation, this paper shows that Peruvian parties are weak and in need of
reform.
Literature Review
Theory of Parties: Role and Importance
Political parties take on a variety of roles for the achievement, preservation, and
enhancement of democracy (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003, Levitsky, 1999). First, parties provide a
vital link between the people and the state, fulfilling a role both in terms of representation and
aggregation of interests (Crabtree, 2010, p.359). They also supply a bridge between executives
and legislatures (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003), which is crucial for overcoming political clogging.
Political parties furnish critical information about what candidates stand for and how they
can be expected to govern, while also providing them with training, experience, and preservation
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(Levitsky, 1999; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Sánchez, 2009). Parties make it possible for voters
to hold their representatives to long-term consequences of policies beyond the next election
(Rosenbluth & Shapiro, 2018, p.230), therefore reshaping politicians’ incentives in ways that
induce them to act in a more collective, responsible, and accountable manner.
Similarly, parties help hold elected leaders accountable to democratic institutions.
Because parties exist beyond a single election and represent a wider view of interests, they are
more trustworthy than even the most appealing politician. Hence, politicians must work through
parties to obtain higher office and must cooperate with them to remain there (Levitsky &
Cameron, 2003; Rosenbluth & Shapiro, 2018, p.230). Having mentioned the importance of
political parties, now there is awareness of what roles and values create an effective party
system.
Theory of Parties: Factors for Weakness and Collapse
Preference for democracy is a crucial factor when talking about party weakness
(Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2013). When a political class is absent, politics becomes a
universe of uncommitted politicians (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Sánchez, 2009; Schedler,
1998), many of whom engage in acts such as suspending the Constitution, arresting opposing
politicians, restricting media, or manipulating electoral results (Maeda, 2010; Levitsky &
Ziblatt, 2018).
Institutions are crucial when talking about party weakness. When a society is populated
by self-interested actors, it becomes difficult for institutions to introduce order (Lebow, 2003,
pp.324,328), leaving opposing politicians defenseless (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003). When
institutions are weak, individuals lose the ability to feel responsible for their own lives (Savater,
2007), which also affects the honesty of vote counting (Schedler, 1998, pp.97-98).
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Populism also plays a role in party weakness, as people who believe parties do not care
about voters are vulnerable to populist demagoguery (Rosenbluth & Shapiro, 2018, p.229;
Roberts, 1995, p.113). When running for office, populists portray their competitors as the
corrupt elite (anti-elitism), speak for the people as a whole (anti-pluralism), and deny party
legitimacy. When in power, populist governance exhibits three main features (Müller, 2016,
Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p.22): attempts to colonize the state, corruption, and mass clientelism.
Another threat for party collapse is executive supremacy (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p.6).
Deadlock may frustrate presidents, leading them to seek unconstitutional solutions, which leaves
people disillusioned and eager for a non-democratic government (Maeda, 2010). When the
individual predominates excessively over the institutions, the harmony of the social whole can
be broken (Savater, 2007), and nobody cares to uphold what should be common to all.
Presidential breakdown is another factor for party fragmentation. While impeachments
serve to remove corrupt or hegemonic presidents, they might harm democracies and deepen
polarization. Deliberately overthrowing presidents might drop citizens’ level of satisfaction with
democracy (Sposito, 2021), creating the conditions for the rise of hegemonic leaders.
Lastly, another factor for party collapse is corruption. Many politicians obtain money
through illicit means with the purpose of personal profit and financing the smooth running of
their parties, which end up becoming the ends of themselves (Savater, 2007): everything that is
done in favor of the party is positive, and anything that hurts it is negative.
Up to this point, it can be noticed how specific factors such as undemocratic behavior,
institutional weakness, populism, executive supremacy, presidential breakdown, and corruption
come as principal enemies of party systems. Eventually, all those threats can be the cause or
consequence of one another, depending on every political context. Also, all those crucial factors
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help understand why the shift from traditional to proto-parties happens in democracies.
Party Politics in Latin America
Latin America has clearly undemocratic political structures that prevent control of
government decisions and the functioning of civil society (Savater, 2007). The state’s presence
looks partial (Schedler, 1998, p.98) and creates a turbulent scenario for parties (Seawright,
2012), therefore generating high electoral volatility, legislative inefficiency, personalism,
executive-legislative deadlock, policy ineffectiveness, and regime crisis (Levitsky, 1999, p.7).
Another factor is the rise of anti-system candidates, none of which are conducive to a
stable democracy (Levitsky, 1999, p.7; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Rosenbluth & Shapiro,
2018, p.199; Barnechea, 1995, p.46; Roberts, 1995, p.112).1 In Latin America, the advocates of
populism have always stressed its inclusionary and emancipatory character (Müller, 2016, p.19),
presenting an illegitimate program that further hurts the population.
Effectively, all those trends affect Latin America as a whole, and with this general
background, it will now be easier to understand the Peruvian case.
Party Politics in Peru
Peru is a presidential regime with a unicameral parliament that follows the principle of
proportional representation (Romero Ballivian, 2007, pp.237-238).2 Presidential elections are
conducted in a two-round system3 with no consecutive re-election for the President (Sulmont
Haak, 2017, p.147).4 Curiously, gaining the presidential seat has always been the goal of
Peruvian parties because of the benefits that come with it (Sulmont Haak, 2017, pp.152,155), as

1

Of all 15 presidents elected in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2012, five were populist
outsiders who ended up weakening democratic institutions (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p.22).
2
The President and parliamentarians are elected simultaneously for a term of five years.
3
If no candidate obtains more than half of the valid votes, there is a call to a second round between the two most voted
candidates.
4
The President can only present himself again after every other presidential term.
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the President is the supreme head of the Armed Forces and of the executive branch.
The Peruvian party system follows a moderate pluralistic system (Romero Ballivian,
2007, pp.237-238), in which coalitions are an opportunistic tool common at every election.
Once elections come around, a party member of a coalition is likely to blame their allies for
ineffective or unpopular policies (Rosenbluth & Shapiro, 2018, pp.35-36) that come from the
coalition.
Peru has an almost pure form of candidate-centered politics that creates a highly
unstable party system. Because the party system is created anew at each election (Levitsky,
1999, p.6; Freidenberg, 2016; Muñoz, 2021), candidates have no interest in party consolidation,
therefore allowing more radical options to gain power.
The decisions that Peruvian representatives make are the result of particular interests,
which creates distrust and leads citizens to party alienation. Therefore, lacking stable referends,
electors must make strong bets at every election (Crabtree, 2010; Muñoz, 2021; LaNegra, 2021),
which limits their capacity (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003) to evaluate candidates retrospectively.
Relevantly, Peruvian parties did not develop a strong institutional presence over long
periods of time, and were often movements associated with specific political leaders (Crabtree,
2001, p.289). As a result, these parties currently have no structured existence over much of the
country, and fail to act as a channel for public participation in the decision-making processes of
the State (Crabtree, 2010, p.359).
Peru also has very marked social cleavages (Forsyth, 2018, p.164) and ethnic
geographical divides (Crabtree, 2010). Exclusion from citizenship rights is an enduring legacy
of colonialism, and many indigenous cultures coexist uneasily with notions of citizenship
(Levitsky & Cameron, 2003). Furthermore, democratic institutions are limited to upper-middle-
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class Lima (Levitsky, 1999; LaNegra, 2021), which affects the formation of a real democratic
movement.
In summary, fragmentation, weak ties to popular sectors, lack of presence, and social
and ethnic divides makes it difficult for Peruvian parties to exercise their democratic functions.
This weakness of the party system, combined with the illegal and particular interests of its
members, creates a big sense of disapproval, rejection, and alienation among Peruvian citizens.
Empirical Analysis (I)
In this section, there is a careful study of every party and the number of votes they gained
during the first rounds of presidential elections from 1980 to 2021. This analysis deals with 18
parties over a total of 10 elections.5 It starts in 1980 because that is the year in which a real
democracy in proper terms can be witnessed, mostly because of universal civil suffrage that was
allowed by the 1979 Constitution.
The variables for this study are number of votes, which are a measure for either party
success or failure, and time in years. Therefore, the number of votes (Y variable) depends on
time in years (X variable). From the main hypothesis, it is shown that, through time, traditional
parties receive fewer votes, and new, personalistic options gain more votes.
Carlos Meléndez (2007) classifies contemporary Peruvian political parties in two groups:
traditional parties (formed before 1979) and new parties (established since the 1990s). Alianza
Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA/PAP), Acción Popular (AP), Partido Popular
Cristiano (PPC), and Izquierda Unida (IU) are part of the first group. In the second group, there
is Fujimorismo, Perú Posible (PP), Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP), Solidaridad Nacional
(SN), and other minor groupings (Sulmont Haak, 2017, p.164; Freidenberg, 2016, p.457).

5

There should have been nine electoral periods, but the democratic transition in 2001 added one more period.
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Table 1

Number of Votes (%) During Presidential Elections 1980-2021

Political Party

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

Acción Popular

44.93

6.25

13.8

1.64

0.42

2001

Alianza para el Progreso

2006

2011

2016

2021

5.75

7.81

6.97

9.12

0.4

9.25

6.02

Alianza Popular
Revolucionaria Americana

27.24

45.74

19.2

4.11

1.38

25.82

Avanza País

24.5

2.91

0.2

11.6

Frente Nacional de Trabajadores
y Campesinos

2

1

0.34

Frente Amplio

18.82

Frente Esperanza

9.85

Fujimorismo
Izquierda Unida

21.26

24.6

64.42

7

0.57

54.97

1.32
7.43

23.53

39.85

Juntos por el Perú
31.75
9.58

10.23

13.8

10.91

11.7

9.25

1.59
2.91

Perú Libre
Perú Posible

13.36

7.85

Partido Nacionalista Peruano
Partido Popular Cristiano

0.45

1.98
19.11

3.24

34.99

37.45

7.81

Peruanos por el Kambio

1.31
21

Solidaridad Nacional,
Renovación Popular
Unión por el Perú

1.8
21.81

0.33

10.91

11.7

4.91

11.67

30.9

4.91

0.7
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In Table 1,6 a total of 18 parties participated in various presidential elections from 1980
to 2021. It is relevant to mention that this table just includes the most suitable groupings that had
been active in presidential elections since 1980. If every party and coalition from each election
were included, there would be a pretty long and confusing table.
In Table 2, there are bar variations as the years move on, showing that there is no real
party consistency.7 The number of votes and all general information were obtained from three
databases: Electoral Geography 2.0: Mapped Politics (Kireev, et al., 2007-2021); Election
Guide: Democracy Assistance and Election News (International Foundation for Electoral
Systems, 2011-2021); and the Political Database of the Americas (PDBA) (Buffo & Langer,
1995-2006).

In 1980 and 1985, the only participants in presidential elections were the traditional
parties and the Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos (FRENATRACA). AP had its
highest voting percentage in 1980, and IU and APRA in 1985. Later, IU and FRENATRACA

6

Purple: traditional parties. Green: party alone. Cyan: political coalition or alliances between parties.
It is interesting to notice how the voting percentage for winners in diverse elections tends to decrease as years move
on. From 1980 to 2000 (with the exception of 1990), all winners gained more than 40% of the vote. From 2000 to
2016, none of the winners surpassed 40% of votes, while in 2021 none of the candidates, and not even the winner,
gained more than 20% of votes.
7
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got less than 1% of the vote in 1995, and ceased to appear for the rest of the table.
PPC mainly participates in elections by forming coalitions with other parties. An
exception happened in 2021 after 36 years, in which PPC gained its lowest result in history:
1.98% of votes. PPC by itself barely reaches 10% of the votes in every election. Therefore, this
is a low-profile party without any relevant year of victory or impressive results.
AP has been the most consistent party in relation to independent and constant
participation, but the number of votes gained through the years is too low. From 1990 until
2021, AP averaged 5.28% of votes. At its lowest, it gained just 0.60% of votes in 2000.
Therefore, in a period of seven electoral cycles, AP barely made it to more than 5% of votes.
With a voting average of less than 10% in 30 years, party survival may be very difficult in the
years to come.
APRA also seems to have wide participation and consistency, but its votes present weird
variations. At its highest, it was at 45.74% in 1985, and then the number of votes started to
decline up to its lowest in history in 2000 (1.38%). But suddenly, the party resurrects in 2001
and 2006 with 25.82% and 24.50% of votes. However, in the next three periods, APRA is
virtually absent. It only participated in the 2016 election, gaining just 5.83% of the overall vote.
Before 1990, traditional parties seemed to be in different numerical positions, meaning
that there was a sort of fair electoral competition between them. APRA and AP were at their
highest, and IU and PPC were at least above 10% of votes. Suddenly, all of them declined in
votes during the 1990s, and just gradually recovered starting in 2001, but none of them reached
more than 10% of the votes from 2011 to 2021.
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Fujimorismo has been participating constantly since 1990, but has some inconsistencies
in the number of votes. In 1990, it gained 24.60% of votes, and suddenly, in both 1995 and
2000, it skyrocketed to 64.42% and 54.97%, being the only single party that presents numbers of
votes surpassing 50%. In 2001, Fujimorismo suffered a slight crisis. However, since 2006, there
has been a gradual recovery in votes: 7.43% in 2006, 23.53% in 2011, and 39.85% in 2016. In
the last 2021 elections, however, it got 13.36% of votes, which is lower than the two previous
periods.
Graph 2 shows that Fujimorismo’s tendency line is very similar to that of the traditional
parties. It follows that pattern of increase, decrease, increase, and decrease again. The main
difference would be that votes for traditional parties decreased during the years that
Fujimorismo was at its highest, and the other way around as well. Therefore, there is a constant
tense relationship between Fujimorismo and traditional parties all throughout 1990 to 2021.
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In relation to personalistic parties, PP seems to be consistent in electoral participation and
also grew in number of votes through the years. Similar to APRA, how can a party have such a
low number of votes in a particular election, and then have such a higher vote during the
consecutive election period?8 Eventually, after the PP first government from 2001 to 2006, the
party declined greatly in the 2011 and 2016 elections, gaining only 7.81% and 1.31% of the vote.
Concerning SN, it has participated actively in presidential elections since 2000. Despite
its alliances with PPC in 2001 and 2006, the party barely gained a little more than 10% in every
election. Renovación Popular (RP), the successor of SN, gained 11.67% in the last 2021 election
and ended in third place,9 which may mean hope for RP as an emerging political force in Peru.
Other proto-parties would be, in the right: Peruanos por el Kambio (PPK), Avanza País,
and Alianza para el Progreso (APP). On the left: Frente Amplio, Juntos por el Perú (JP), Frente
Esperanza, Unión por el Perú (UPP), PNP, and Perú Libre (PL). All these parties are so new that

8

After analyzing the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections, it can be seen that many parties (APRA, UP, UP, SL, IU,
FRENATRACA, and PP) got their lowest voting percentage in those particular years. The answer for this common
phenomenon would be the Fujimori regime, which affected parties greatly.
9
Compared to other candidates, that score was technically high for the specific election (as the winner got 19.11%).
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most of them only participated in two presidential elections so far, on average.10 Because of
their low participation, it is difficult to specify a tendency or a rate of success throughout the
years.

Frente Esperanza is in crisis, never reaching more than 10% of votes, while Avanza País
barely makes it to 11.60% in 2021. Concerning APP, it has very low numbers, not even making
it to 10% in any of the three elections it participated in. Frente Amplio reached almost 20% of
votes in 2016 (18.82%), but only got 0.45% (And JP, 7.85%) in 2021.
In relation to UPP, its votes declined from 21.81% in 1995 to 0.33% in 2000, the latest
being their lowest in history. It recovered in 2006 (30.90%), but its power decreased heavily in
2011 (4.91%) and 2021 (0.70%). In relation to the PNP, it got 31.75% of the votes in 2011, and
won the presidential palace. Same as with APRA and PP, after its time in power, the PNP would
take part in the 2021 elections and gain just 1.59% of the vote.
Lastly, PL, even though it only participated in the 2021 election, represents the perfect

10

UPP participated in four elections, APP participated in three elections, and PL, JP, and PPK in just one election.
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example of what the main hypothesis tries to show. A personalistic vehicle, with no previous
electoral history, founded after the 1990s, non-traditional, anti-elite, left-wing Marxist ideology,
and mainly rural-oriented, this party won the 2021 presidential election with just 19.11% of
votes. More information about the parties is revealed in the historical chronology and the
second empirical analysis on the urbanization rates per presidential election from 2000 to 2021.
Historical Chronology
1821 to 1980: José de la Riva Agüero (Military) to Francisco Morales Bermúdez (Military)
Peru was born without political parties (LaNegra, 2021). The first governors of the Latin
American nations were victorious generals from the period of emancipation wars, and since then,
military headquarters seemed to be the natural form of government. This explains the low grade
of democratic tradition in Latin America, as well as why the armed forces continue to be one of
the few institutions with major internal cohesion (Mires, 2006, pp.3-4).11
Military men governed Peru without pause from 1821 to 1872, and did not see an option
in political democracy. They ignored the separation of powers, submitted Congress to their
dominance, and did not even look to form a political party (LaNegra, 2021).12 By the end of the
20th century, Peruvians had lived under military governments for two-thirds of their republican
existence (Bowen, 2000), which definitely affected party development and consolidation.
Just towards the 1870s, the Partido Civil, the first party, began to take shape (LaNegra,
2021; Heredia Vargas, 2003, p.40) and tried to bring together various elites from different
regions of the North Coast (Del Águila, 2009). Similar to the Partido Civil, democratic regimes
in the 1940s and 1960s were associated with a political class that was mostly drawn from a small

11

The Armed Forces have traditionally played an influential role in Peruvian politics (Hudson, et al., 1993, p. 230).
Peruvian generals like Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) pretended to develop a curious pattern between
nationalism, populism, mass movements, and military dictatorships (Mires, 2006, p.4).
12
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European elite (Levitsky, 1999; Sulmont Haak, 2017). By the end of the 19th century, four-fifths
of the Peruvian population lived on the fringes of “official Peru” (Jochamowitz, 1994, p.328).
From the very beginning, there was difficulty in extending citizenship rights to the mass
of the population (Crabtree, 2001). In the 1963 elections, Peru was the Latin American country
with the smallest proportion of voters registered in the electoral roll: barely 18% of the
population (LaNegra, 2021, p.108; Del Águila, 2009, p.45). The small European elite was never
able to democratize Peruvian society because they refused to give up their privileges. They
believed they were Peru, but seemed to portray the Anti-Peru (Jochamowitz, 1994, p.328).
In the Peruvian Andes, conflicts with the Quechua, Aimara, and Amazonian ethnic groups
were frequent, as those sectors were not represented by political parties. In addition to their
illiteracy,13 the Andes suddenly acquired less political importance (Del Águila, 2009). Political
exclusion generated the problem of elections in which the main beneficiaries of urgent changes
were not even able to vote. Furthermore, this discrimination also generated deep and
longstanding inequalities (LaNegra, 2021; Crabtree, 2001) based on geography, race, and class.
The history of party politics in Peru in the 20th century starts with APRA, founded in
1924 by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (Barnechea, 1995, p.45; Hudson, et al., 1993, pp.41,225).14
This party advocated for anti-imperialism, Latin American integration, indigenism, and antioligarchic struggle (Sulmont Haak, 2017, p.164; Seawright, 2012, p.38; Heredia Vargas, 2003,
p.42). Overcoming the death of its leader in 1979, APRA emerged as a leading center-left party
(Kenney, 2003; Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005, p.264) in the 1980s.

13

Between the beginning of the 20th century and until 1970, Peru had an average illiteracy rate of 56.50%. In 1900, the
illiteracy rate was 75.70%, which was three-quarters of the country. By 1970, this percentage was reduced to 29.60%.
Still, this meant that at least one-third of the population was not eligible for voting (Thorp, 1998, p.354).
14
APRA’s initial political program promoted the formation of a popular alliance of intellectuals, sectors of the urban
media, and the rural proletariat (Sulmont Haak, 2017, p.164).
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AP was founded in 1956 by Fernando Belaúnde, and situates itself in the center-right to
far-right of the political spectrum (Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005, p.264; Sulmont Haak, 2017,
p.170; Seawright, 2012, p.40; Heredia Vargas, 2003, p.41; Hudson, et al., 1993, p.225). Thirdly,
PPC was founded in 1966 by Luis Bedoya Reyes, and has been located towards the center-right
since its foundation (Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005, p.264; Sulmont Haak, 2017, p.168-169;
Cameron, 1994, p.19; Heredia Vargas, 2003, p.41; Hudson, et al., 1993, p.226). These three
groupings are the only traditional parties that are still politically active up to this present day.
In the 1960s and 1970s, new left-wing parties were formed and made crucial advances in
their connection with popular, communal, and syndical organizations. Most of them believed in
the role of the armed struggle in the seizure of power, which involved a rejection of elections. In
this period, various left groupings formed IU, an important political force throughout the 1980s
(Sulmont Haak, 2017, p.162; Seawright, 2012, pp.41-42; Heredia Vargas, p.42). The convocation
of elections in 1980 forced the left to choose between participating in the democratic process or
abstaining and denouncing the elections as a trap created by the Military (Cameron, 1994, p.25).
Around this time, a group that rejected both democracy and elections would begin to
organize in the 1970s. Having its origins in the middle of the excluded, poor, and marginalized
populations of the Andes, this group would provoke one of the cruelest periods of violence in
Peruvian history: Sendero Luminoso (LaNegra, 2021; Del Águila, 2009; Lefranc, 2004), founded
in 1969 by Abimael Guzmán (Hudson, et al., 1993, p.54).15 Sendero appeared publicly for the
first time on May 18th, 1980 (Bowen, 2000, p.92; Heredia Vargas, 2003; Hudson, et al., 1993,
p.305), on the eve of the long-awaited general elections that ended the military dictatorship.

15

Guzmán, a philosophy professor, blended the ideas of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and those of José Carlos
Mariátegui, Peru’s major Marxist theoretician.
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In summary, from the beginning of the Peruvian Republic and up until the 1970s, there
were many crucial events affecting parties and general politics. First, the low democratic tradition
in Latin America was mainly the result of a strong military influence in government. Secondly,
the problem of representation and inequalities left many citizens abandoned and without civic
rights, while elites controlled the political life of the country.
Around this time, traditional parties were born. Similarly, as a result of the previously
mentioned undemocratic scenario, new left-wing parties appeared in the political game, most
notably Sendero Luminoso in the 1970s. Having now solid background information on these
parties, it is time to describe their relationship and interactions during the decade following 1979.
1980 to 1990: Fernando Belaúnde (AP) and Alan García (APRA)
The commemoration of 100 years of Peruvian independence found citizenship that did
not even reach women or the illiterate indigenous majority (LaNegra, 2021). This process of
democratic struggle in civil society led the military government to call for presidential elections
in May 1980 (Gambini & Surpachín, 2015, p.3), making Peru one of the first countries in South
America to undergo the transition from long-term institutionalized military rule (Hudson, et al.,
1993, p.207) to democratic government.
Most importantly, the Constitution of 1979 provided universal suffrage for the first time.
The right to vote was extended to illiterate people, which implied the incorporation of an
important group of citizens, especially from rural areas of the country (Crabtree, 2001, p.290;
Sulmont Haak, 2017, p.147; Hudson, et al., 1993, p.212). Hence, Peru was finally turned into a
democracy that incorporated all adults into full citizenship (LaNegra, 2021; Heredia Vargas,
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2003).16 This Constitution also eliminated the system of indirect election of the President17 by
introducing the second presidential round, raising the electoral threshold to more than 50% of the
valid votes (Sulmont Haak, 2017, p.147). If no presidential candidate obtained more than half of
the votes, there would be a call to a second-round between the two most voted candidates.
Throughout most of the 1980s, Peru possessed a relatively coherent, but young and weakly
institutionalized, four-party system: AP, PPC, IU and APRA (Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005,
p.264; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Kenney, 2003; Sánchez, 2009, p.512; Seawright, 2012, p.47;
Tanaka, 1998, pp.53,71). Although the strength of these parties has been a subject of debate, all
possessed national structures, discernible programs or ideologies, fair representation capacity, and
identifiable social bases. In the 1985 presidential election, the four parties collectively accounted
for more than 90% of the vote (Freidenberg, 2016; Kenney, 2003; Del Águila, 2009, p.48;
Tanaka, 1998, p.53; Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005, p.267; Heredia Vargas, 2003, p.42).
The traditional parties became widely discredited by the late 1980s for a whole host of
reasons (Sánchez, 2009). First, Peru was already suffering a strong economic crisis and,
gradually, it began to stop being subject to credit during the AP government of Fernando
Belaúnde (1980-1985) (Forsyth, 2018, p.81). In 1982 and 1983, prices for Peru’s exports fell, and
climatic conditions affected agricultural produce and the fishing industry (Cameron, 1994, p.42;
Heredia Vargas, 2003, p.29). Furthermore, Belaúnde’s administration exercised extensive state
spending in infrastructure, which expanded the Peruvian State’s already large external debt ($9.6
billion dollars in 1980) to a new record of $10.55 billion dollars by 1985 (Seawright, 2012, p.65;
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Between 1956 and 2016, the citizenship amplification tripled citizen participation in the lapse of 50 years (LaNegra,
2021, p.56).
17
Until the elections of 1963, the President had to obtain at least one-third of the valid votes to be elected, otherwise
the Parliament would choose the President among the three most-voted candidates.
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Hudson, et al., 1993, p.54), generating an alarming economic problem for the country.18
This situation became worse later with Alan García’s government (1985-1990), who
inherited the leadership of APRA following the death of Haya de la Torre. Young and
charismatic, García cultivated an enormous personal following that led APRA to the presidency
in 1985 (Roberts, 1995, p.93; Gambini & Surpachín, 2015, p.4). Upon his arrival to power, he
stopped paying the foreign debt (Forsyth, 2018, p.81), established price controls (Thorp, 1998;
Roberts, 1995, p.93), and promoted extensive state spending to increase domestic demand
(Seawright, 2012, p.66), which once again created a massive trade deficit.
Economic mismanagement during both governments contributed to a very difficult
structural situation that eventually led to hyperinflation,19 and the deepest recession in living
memory (Crabtree, 2001, p.290; Sulmont Haak, 2017; Barnechea, 1995; Kenney, 2003, p.1231).
Between 1986 and 1990, Peru had an average inflation rate of 1,662.5%, and a growth rate of
2%. Yet, the 1980s ended with an inflation rate of 7,481.7% (Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005,
p.265; Heredia Vargas, 2003, p.56), being one of the highest in Latin America at that time.
Secondly, the insurgency of Sendero Luminoso went from being a small, rural, and
relatively localized uprising to a much wider conflict involving both urban and rural spaces. They
did not only declare war on the State, but on the party system as a whole (Crabtree, 2001;
Sulmont Haak, 2017; Del Águila, 2009). Sendero destroyed infrastructure, caused many deaths,
and sowed panic, scaring off potential national and foreign investors (Forsyth, 2018, p.81). At its
peak, Sendero had 10,000 full-time combatants, the support of about 15% of Peru’s population,
and some degree of control over almost a third of Peru’s municipalities (Seawright, 2012, p.61).

18

During Belaúnde’s term, per capita GDP fell by 11% and inflation accumulated to 3,584% (Kenney, 2003, p.1231).
During García’s administration, per capita GDP fell a total of 15%, and by his last year in office annual inflation had
skyrocketed to more than 3,800% (Kenney, 2003, p.1231).
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These twin crises had a devastating impact on the party system as a whole (Crabtree,
2010, p.364). By the end of Belaúnde’s term, over 6,000 Peruvians had died from the violence,
and over $1 billion dollars in property damage had resulted (Hudson, et al., 1993, pp.54-55).
Given Belaúnde’s doleful performance,20 the public desisted from entrusting national government
to AP (Kenney, 2003, p.1231; Tanaka, 1998, p.107), and in the 1985 elections, AP barely
managed to obtain 6.30% of votes (Sulmont Haak, 2017, p.170; Hudson, et al., 1993, p.226).21
Similarly, the crises also strongly affected APRA’s militancy in the interior of the
country. More than 1,000 party members were assassinated by Sendero, and by the end of his
period, García’s popularity fell even further than Belaúnde’s (from 90% to 21%, having reached
a low of 9% in 1989) (Kenney, 2003, p.1232). Therefore, electoral support for APRA declined
significantly: 20% in 1990, 4% in 1995, and 1% in 2000 (Sulmont Haak, 2017, p.166).
Public rejection of AP and APRA was the greatest source of electoral volatility in 1985
and 1990 (Kenney, 2003, p.1232). The twin crises revealed starkly the limitations of both the
State and those designated to manage it, and created a deep sense of instability at all levels of
society. The weaknesses of the parties were exposed as they had not only failed to resolve the
country’s problems, but appeared to have worsened them (Crabtree, 2001, p.290; Tanaka, 1998).
Even though PPC was not directly involved in the twin crises, it also suffered chronic
electoral weakness during the 1980s. One main problem was the perception of the PPC as
extremely conservative, as it had an average score of 8.3 on a 10-point left-right scale, while the
average respondent was located at 5.4.22 Another factor that contributed to its weakness was its
socially exclusive nature, as most of its supporters came from the tiny upper and small middle
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Belaúnde’s approval rating fell from 75% in 1980 to 26% by 1985 (Kenney, 2003, p.1231; Tanaka, 1998, p.107).
Sulmont Haak (2017) places AP at 6.20% of the vote in 1985, while Hudson, et al. (1993) place it at 6.40%. Still, the
low percentage is portrayed in both cases as a way to display the political failure of AP.
22
None of the other parties were located farther from the average voter in 1987 than PPC.
21
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classes in Lima (Kenney, 2003, p.1232).
Peru, even nowadays, has a high level of informal economic activity (Forsyth, 2018,
p.164). The fast growth of the informal sector in the late 1980s encompassed more than 50% of
the economically active population by 1990, which eventually weakened class-based
organizations, eroded collective and partisan identities, and produced a growing pool of “floating
voters” (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003, p.6; Sánchez, 2009, p.500; Crabtree, 2010, p.364).
In his book El Otro Sendero (1986), Hernando de Soto argues that the informal workers
were victims of an interventionist state and impeded by bureaucratic red tape and legalisms.
(Bowen, 2000, p.15; Ritter, et al., 1992, p.211; Hudson, et al., 1993, p.156). Class remained a
powerful predictor of the vote, yet class-based parties were unable to retain the working class and
the informal sector. Therefore, these groups lost interest in candidates of the left or right
(Cameron, 1994, p.10), and became increasingly attracted to outsider candidates.
Parties had a difficult role to play in a country with such a wide breach between the State
and society. The party system was poorly prepared to weather the twin challenges (Crabtree,
2001), which limited its capacity to build enduring linkages to the new emerging electorate
(Levitsky & Cameron, 2003). Although both IU and APRA successfully appealed to the working
classes in the 1970s and 1980s, neither of these forces was able to consolidate a stable base of
support among the rural poor or the urban informal sector (Levitsky, 1999).
By the late 1980s, all parties had lost the capacity to attract broad-based support in a
society that remained highly stratified along racial and sociocultural lines. Even parties that had
once mobilized significant popular bases were perceived to have been co-opted into an aging and
predominantly white, Lima-based oligarchic elite (Levitsky, 1999) that was increasingly out of
touch with the day-to-day realities of most Peruvians.

RES PUBLICA XXVII | 68
So far, many events have happened during the 1980s. First, the Constitution of 1979
erased previous restrictions suffered by many ethnic groups. Secondly, the parties were described
as weakly institutionalized because of the low democratic tradition already mentioned. Even
though elitism was still prevalent, there were three new main external factors that would
negatively affect traditional parties: economic crisis, political violence, and the growth of the
informal sector, all which exposed the already mentioned weaknesses of all the parties.
1990 to 2000: Alberto Fujimori (Fujimorismo)
Peruvian parties found their deepest crisis in the 1990s with two disastrous
administrations that brought deep distrust and poor effective government (LaNegra, 2021).23
Although widely discredited, the established parties survived the 1990 election (Levitsky &
Cameron, 2003), reaching around half the percentage (53.80%) of total votes.
On the right, writer Mario Vargas Llosa, along with AP and PPC, formed the Frente
Democrático (FREDEMO), which presented his candidacy for the 1990 elections (Kenney, 2003;
Hudson, et al., 1993, p.226). Vargas Llosa ran against Alberto Fujimori, the semi-unknown son
of Japanese immigrants who came as a “perfect faceless” (Freidenberg, 2016; Jochamowitz,
1994, p.254; Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005, pp.265,269; Mauceri, 1997; Roberts, 1995, p.92).
When Peru was totally devastated (Forsyth, 2018, p.93; Thorp, 1998, p.252), Fujimori
surprisingly won the 1990 elections (Sulmont Haak, 2017; Freidenberg, 2016; Ritter, et al., 1992,
p.138). Rallying with a newly created party named Cambio 90,24 Fujimori’s rise to power became
intimately linked to a widespread rejection of parties as both incompetent and corrupt (Crabtree,
2001; Hudson, et al., 1993, p.208, Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p.176). Like classical populists,
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APRA’s government had no possibility of being reelected, as the economic chaos and increasing terrorist
advancements undermined its electoral support (Bowen, 2000, p.21; Tanaka, 1998, p.162).
24
Cambio 90 lacked a program, a national structure, and a minimal activist base.
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Fujimori’s discourse was anti-elitist and anti-establishment (Roberts, 1995, p.97).
It is said that Vargas Llosa lost the elections because he was totally out of touch with
Peruvian reality (Bowen, 2000), and had the mistake of abandoning the center (Tanaka, 1998,
p.192; Agüero & Stark, 1998, p.211).25 Vargas Llosa, like many other politicians, ignored the
vast mass of real Peru (Barnechea, 1995, pp.377-378), composed by uncountable little minorities
who were foreign to the official society and language of the creole elite.
For most Peruvians, predominantly Andean, Fujimori resembled them (Agüero & Stark,
1998, p.211; Barnechea, 1995, p.379). Indeed, Fujimori’s facial features, “outsider” migratory
status, and modest origins were more reminiscent of Peru’s mestizo and indigenous majority than
those of the Europeanized Vargas Llosa. Fujimori, then, was a leader who had emerged from the
common people (Roberts, 1995, p.95) to offer a fresh alternative.
While President, Fujimori managed to maintain high levels of support (Crabtree, 2001)
but generated the conditions for a complete democratic collapse (LaNegra, 2021). During most of
the 1990s, Fujimori governed the country along with two non-elected agents of power: General
Nicolás Hermoza, leader of the Armed Forces, and Vladimiro Montesinos, leader of the National
Intelligence Service (SIN) (Crabtree, 2001, p.292; Mauceri, 1997; Bowen, 2000).
Fujimorismo represented a conservative and authoritarian side of Latin American
populism, which was neither fully authoritarian nor properly democratic (Sulmont Haak, 2017;
Crabtree, 2010). It included basic norms of democracy, but embodied strongly authoritarian
features, such as concentration of power and a direct, top-down relationship between government
and the mass of the population (Crabtree, 2001).
Pragmatism, authoritarianism, and secrecy were traits that autobiographically marked
25

More than for his ideological stances, Vargas Llosa just abandoned the center so that he could surround himself
exclusively with representatives of the formal “white/criollo” elite (Agüero & Stark, 1998, p.211).
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Fujimori’s politics and government (Jochamowitz, 1994), as loyalty was all or nothing (Sulmont
Haak, 2017; Crabtree, 2001). He painstakingly built a thoroughly corrupt political regime, where
his operatives co-opted, bought off, harassed, intimidated, or persecuted political opponents in all
relevant State institutions (Sánchez, 2009).
Having won the elections, Fujimori had no program ready for implementation, no real
party behind him (Maeda, 2010, p.1130; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Bowen, 2000; Tanaka,
1998, p.20), and no majority in Congress (LaNegra, 2021; Bowen, 2000; Kenney, 2003). His
initial support from APRA and the left quickly evaporated, and most leading sectors of the
political, economic and religious establishment opposed him (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003).
Lacking experience (Ritter, et al., 1992, p.138), Fujimori opted for an authoritarian
strategy to secure his political survival (Kenney, 2003; Tanaka, 1998, p.20). On April 5th, 1992,
with the support of the Armed Forces (Gambini & Surpachín, 2015, p.5), the Government
conducted a palace self-coup (autogolpe), shut down Congress, and captured the main institutions
of power control. Soon later, the 1979 Constitution, which prohibited the immediate re-election of
the President, was replaced by the 1993 Constitution, which introduced the figure of immediate
re-election (Maeda, 2010, p.1130; LaNegra, 2021; Crabtree, 2001; Mauceri, 1997; Hudson, et al.,
1993, p.208; Sulmont Haak, 2017, p.155).26
The economic crisis and security problems helped Fujimori to impose the idea that the
objectives of stability and order could not be achieved with the current institutions (Freidenberg,
2016). One of the pretexts for the autogolpe was the need for a reform of the judiciary, claiming
that it was both inefficient and corrupt. Similarly, Fujimori claimed that parties were completely
divorced from reality, and incapable of fulfilling their function of representing the people. Both

26

Immediate re-election allowed Fujimori to participate a second time in the 1995 elections.
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arguments were accepted by Peruvians (Crabtree, 2001; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Bowen,
2000, p.127; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p.191), who surely saw a savior in Fujimori.
In massively backing the coup, Peruvians converted Fujimori into a “democratic dictator”
(Levitsky, 1999). The autogolpe signified the collapse of the party system, as it took place at a
time when Fujimori’s popularity was on the rise (Sánchez, 2009; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003;
Freidenberg, 2016). Public support for Fujimori jumped from 53% in March 1992 to 81% after
the autogolpe (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003, p.8), and by late 1992, many Peruvians had decided
that Fujimori was the sort of strong leader they had been waiting for.
Following the coup, Fujimori vanquished hyperinflation and reestablished the economy.
Moreover, Sendero was crippled in 1992 with Guzmán’s capture, leaving the group disheartened
and depleted. Fujimori’s extraordinary successes in combatting hyperinflation and terrorism
eliminated the crisis conditions that previously legitimated authoritarian rule (Agüero & Stark,
1998, p.211; Bowen, 2000, p.161; Forsyth, 2018; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003, pp.93-94; Thorp,
1998, p.252; Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005, p.275; Roberts, 1995; Hudson, et al., 1993, p.309).
Fujimori had his social base in the marginal sectors of Peruvian society: non-whites,
evangelicals,27 informal-sector workers, and the urban and rural poor (Levitsky, 1999; Bowen,
2000). Beginning in 1993, Fujimori used social spending to build support among the rural
peasantry and the urban informal sector, mainly through welfare programs. Similarly, he spent
much of his time traveling around the country (Agüero & Stark, 1998, p.211; Crabtree, 2001,
p.296; Mauceri, 1997, p.902) and developing clientelistic networks (Mauceri, 1997).28
Fujimori was the greatest adversary of the 1980s party system (Kenney, 2003, p.1230;

27

Fujimori perceived the importance of evangelicals, as they had useful connections in Peruvian rural zones. By the
end of 1980, it was common to see evangelical tents at the center of forgotten towns in the Andes and Jungle.
28
The results of the 1995 elections, in which Fujimori won 64% of the votes, provided a vindication for this approach.
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Crabtree, 2010, p.365; Sánchez, 2009; Mauceri, 1997), and took advantage of a weakened
political class to concentrate power (Levitsky, 1999; Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005, p.263;
Mauceri, 1997, p.901). Fujimori was unique in confronting the parties rather than converting
them to the new neoliberal message (Crabtree, 2010), and instead of building a political party, he
created “disposable parties” (Levitsky, 1999; Freidenberg, 2016).29
Lacking an organized base and without a party of his own (Mauceri, 1997, p.908),
Fujimori avoided dependence on other parties and created a close alignment with the Military
(Crabtree, 2001, p.292). In an increasingly chaotic environment, the Armed Forces were the only
national institution that functioned efficiently (Bowen, 2000; Roberts, 1995, p.101), and the
terrorist attacks gave them a genuine reason for being crucial in their political influence.
During the 1980s, candidate-centered electoral strategies were rarely an alternative to
parties, but Fujimori’s achievements suggested that established party labels were no longer
necessary for a successful political career (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003). As a result of Fujimori’s
anti-political discourses against the parties, an “anti-system” attitude emerged in the country.
This was visible in the proliferation of improvised, personalistic, and pragmatic organizations
(Gambini & Surpachín, 2015, p.6) that emerged during Fujimori’s government.
The 1992 autogolpe was the point at which party representation was effectively broken
(Crabtree, 2001; Kenney, 2003; Tanaka, 1998, p.229)30 and traditional parties were replaced not
by new parties, but by “independent movements” (Levitsky, 1999; Freidenberg, 2016; Tanaka,
1998, p.223).31 Politicians who wished to survive distanced themselves from previously

29

Disposable parties were minimalist organizations created for a single election and then discarded. Fujimori had as
many as four different electoral vehicles to contest in different elections since 1990: Cambio 90, Vamos Vecino, Perú
2000 and Sí Cumple (Sánchez, 2009; Sulmont Haak, 2017; Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005, p.278).
30
This was made clear in the 1995 presidential elections, when established parties could master 6.30% of the vote.
31
Independent movements were personalistic campaign vehicles that were discarded after elections.
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established party affiliations, and stood as independents (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Crabtree,
2001), generating a massive hemorrhaging of the established parties.
At the same time, many new and aspiring politicians began to create their parties instead
of joining existing ones. Indeed, all the country’s successful parties in the late 1990s were
personalistic candidate-centered vehicles that lacked national structures or even minimal links to
civil society (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Sulmont Haak, 2017).32 Although traditional parties
participated in subsequent elections, they fared poorly. In 2000, all of the top candidates for the
presidency were proto-party candidates,33 and the traditional parties together received less than
2% of the vote (Kenney, 2003; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003, pp.9,12).
Along with this emergence of proto-parties, Fujimori brought other serious consequences
for democracy. For example, the system of clientelism generated inherently weak loyalties, as it
radically affected the integrity of the electoral process. Influencing the vote with favors and
buying the will of voters is undemocratic (Latinobarometro, 2017, p.41), and when the economic
rewards or other incentives ceased, support for Fujimori would evaporate (Crabtree, 2001).
Fujimorismo has left deep scars that will continue to undermine party system
institutionalization in the future (Sánchez, 2009). By freeing himself from institutional
constraints, Fujimori created major problems concerning regime succession and regeneration
(Crabtree, 2001). The party system has disintegrated to a degree that is unrivaled in Latin
America. Whereas in the 1980s the traditional parties accounted for roughly 90% of the votes, a
decade later the same parties accounted for less than 10% of the votes (Levitsky, 1999, p.6).

32

Without an appeal that transcended the individual candidate, and without programs or ideologies to identify
themselves, many of these new “independent movements” adopted names based on the locality in which they were
competing (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Levitsky, 1999).
33
The only traditional party leader who even registered in the opinion polls was former president Alan García, and most
polls placed him at less than 3% (Levitsky, 1999, p.6).
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Although traditional parties bore a heavy responsibility for the crisis of the late 1980s,
their absence in the 1990s created a political marketplace in which loyalties could be traded at
great speed (Crabtree, 2001).34 These parties have become virtually extinct: the left has
disappeared from the political map, AP35 and PPC are mere shells of what they once were, and
APRA got reduced to a small, cult-like core of activists (Levitsky, 1999; Sulmont Haak, 2017).
In summary, it seems as if Fujimori was both a blessing and a curse for Peru. He
effectively tore down inflation and terrorism while also displaying care for marginalized groups.
Eventually, these successes made him really popular but also affected traditional parties. While
these parties failed to solve the country’s problems, Fujimori portrayed them as enemies of the
people, which explains the shift to proto-parties. People got inspired by the Fujimori experience,
and did not find party dependence as a necessity for gaining office. Therefore, many politicians
left their parties and joined new ones, or created their own.
2000 to 2021: Valentín Paniagua (AP) to Francisco Sagasti (PM)
In September 2000, a release of a video showing SIN director Montesinos paying off a
“transfuse” exposed the dark side of the Fujimori regime. This political scandal destroyed
Congress as a functioning institution and damaged the President’s already questionable electoral
legitimacy. Seeing no other way out, Fujimori resigned, and within weeks the entire regime
collapsed (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Freidenberg, 2016; Bermúdez-Tapia, 2020).
Under the leadership of Interim President Valentín Paniagua, Peru underwent a successful
democratic transition. The institutions were reformed and media independence increased
enormously, while hundreds of military officers were purged for their relationship with

34

Everlong-established mass parties like APRA in the 1990s operated at a very minimal level, having ceased to act as
relevant conduits for public discontent and frustration.
35
During the Fujimori regime, the AP entered into a process of sharp electoral decline. Its candidates in 1995 and 2000
did not exceed 2% of the vote (Sulmont Haak, 2017, p.70).
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Montesinos. Furthermore, Congress modified the Constitution to eliminate the figure of
consecutive presidential re-election36 and return to the provision established in 1979 (Sulmont
Haak, 2017, p.156; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Freidenberg, 2016; Gambini & Surpachín, 2015).
This democratic transition culminated in new presidential elections on April 8th, 2001.
All presidential candidates except García ran on tickets that did not exist before 1990, and most
of these were candidate-centered vehicles with little substance (Sulmont Haak, 2017; Hagopian
& Mainwaring, 2005, p.287). Meanwhile, the vestigial Fujimorista forces were virtually wiped
out, gaining just four of 120 seats in Congress (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003, p.22).
After the end of Fujimori’s regime in November 2000, Peruvians have lived a long period
of respect for minimum standards of democracy. Four presidents assumed office after legitimate
elections: Toledo, García, Ollanta Humala,37 and Pedro P. Kuczynski (LaNegra, 2021; Sulmont
Haak, 2017). In a real sense, democracy was restored with the 2001 election, but the party system
has not been reestablished: mechanisms of representation remained weak, and personalism,
electoral volatility, and party-switching remained high (Sánchez, 2009; Levitsky & Cameron,
2003), creating a “chaotic and unpredictable panorama.” (Bermúdez-Tapia, 2020, p.207).
At this point in time, it is crucial to understand the situation of the surviving traditional
parties. APRA depends a lot on Alan Garcia’s charismatic leadership, and without the emergence
of alternative national leaders, it is difficult for the party to consolidate its institutionalization.
AP, with the deaths of Belaúnde (2002) and Paniagua (2006), does not have recognized national
leaders, and its organizational bases are very weak (Sulmont Haak, 2017).
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The abuses of power committed by Fujimori caused the figure of re-election to be viewed with extreme distrust by a
large part of the political actors, the country’s intellectual elites, and sectors of the public opinion (Sulmont Haak, 2017,
p.156).
37
Humala’s party (PNP) depends a lot on the decisions and electoral projects of its leader. It lacks professional and
technical cadres, nor does it have many leaders who have extensive political or parliamentary experience.
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Lastly, PPC has difficulty generating greater electoral support beyond the capital, as most
of its cadres and political leaders come from Lima (Gambini & Surpachín, 2015, p.22). Unlike
other parties strongly dependent on the figure of its charismatic leaders, the PPC has been able to
form alternative political cadres, but with restricted national scope (Sulmont Haak, 2017).
Overall, all traditional parties (with the only exception of IU) are still alive in the 21st
century but seem to get worse as time goes on. They are losing support, their main leaders are
dying, and, most importantly, they are quickly getting replaced by proto-parties.
2021 to Present: Pedro Castillo (PL)
The 2021 elections saw a deepening of the problems of democracy without parties,
generating what Meléndez calls “mini-candidates.” These are political actors with low-intensity
charisma, scarce political resources, and proto-parties highly dependent on them. One of these,
Pedro Castillo, from PL, won the first presidential round with 18.92% of votes (La Negra, 2021,
p.81), the lowest percentage for a winner in Peruvian presidential history.
Castillo rallied with a populist discourse that painted the heartless rich and the capital’s
political class as enemies of the people, and promised to convene a constituent assembly “to
create a Constitution that has the color, smell and flavor of the people.” (Muñoz, 2021, p.57). His
populist discourse was effective in mobilizing mostly poorer and rural voters, in part due to their
tendency to identify with his humble personal manner and origins (Muñoz, 2021). Furthermore,
Castillo’s popular mandate depends on pushing reforms to please his supporters from rural areas
and dissatisfy the Lima-based elite (Sposito, 2021).
The problem is that it is difficult for Peruvians to trust parties and their applicants, as the
political offer is viewed with a mixture of suspicion and disdain (LaNegra, 2021). Political
parties are currently the least trusted democratic institutions in Peru, with just a 11% level of trust
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(Latinobarometro, 2017, pp.26-27). Nor have their leaders done well in the public eye (LaNegra,
2021; Bermúdez-Tapia, 2020), as most of them are currently involved in corruption scandals.
Reaching now the end of the chronology, it is important to exercise a deep reflection on
the factors that affected party development and consolidation during these last 40 years of events.
All traditional parties are almost nonexistent, with all their leaders dead, unwilling to form a real
party, or involved in corruption. Most surprisingly, this is also the case with some proto-parties,
which makes the democratic situation even worse, and that explains why satisfaction with
Peruvian democracy and the political parties is so low.
With a better understanding of all the facts already mentioned, it is now easier to interpret
the data portrayed in the first empirical section. There were many questions uncovered, and new
information was found, creating a logical explanation for why Peruvian parties are weak.
Therefore, it is now suitable to read the second empirical section.
Empirical Analysis (II)
This section measures the level of urbanization for every party’s vote. By doing this, it
can be determined where the parties get their votes from, and how and why some parties may
receive more urban or rural support. In Table 1, there is already an analysis of the number of
votes that every party had from the years 1980 to 2021, which serves as an adequate measure for
party development and success in the political arena.
In this new study, there is an analysis by region. This method portrays more effectively
and accurately the social, economic, and geographical differences in multiple Peruvian areas,
which helps provide better urbanization voting results from 2001 to 2021. Therefore, this section
answers the question: Are the votes mainly rural or urban?
The first variable used is the level of urbanization, which is measured by the number of
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votes in every presidential election. This first variable is divided into four categories: rural, semiurban, urban, high urban, and very high urban. Rural and semi-urban areas work hand in hand,
and all the urban-plus divisions are comparatively homogeneous as well.
In Image 1, Peru displays 25 regions divided into three main geographical divisions:
Coast, Andes, and Rainforest (or Jungle). As mentioned, all those regions are highly diverse
concerning socioeconomic, racial, ethnic, and geographical statuses. The rates and urbanization
information were obtained from a platform called “City Population,” in which information from
the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI) is included (Brinkhoff, 1998-2021).
Image 1.

First, rural regions are classified as having less than 50% urban population, meaning a
predominantly rural majority. In this group, there are four regions in total: Huancavelica,
Apurímac, Cajamarca, and Amazonas. Three of these regions are Andean regions which, besides
being the most rural regions, are also the ones with the highest poverty rates in Peru.
Second, semi-urban regions are those that have between 50 and 60% of urban population.
These are four regions, all of which belong to the Andes: Ayacucho, Puno, Cusco, and Huánuco.
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Again, it is surprising that there are no regions from the Coast that belong to any of the two
categories. Besides the fact that access to the sea helps with urbanization (Robert, 2019),38 it can
be implied that many of the Andeans regions did not develop urbanistically because of the lack of
attention and discrimination that the State had against minority groups that lived in those regions.
Third, the urban regions are the ones that have a level of urbanization that ranks between
60 and 85%. This is the biggest category because it includes 10 regions in total. Contrary to the
previous cases, there are only two regions that belong to the Andes (Pasco and Junín). Four
regions belong to the Jungle (San Martín, Madre de Dios, Loreto and Ucayali) and four regions
belong to the Coast (La Libertad, Lambayeque, Piura, and Ancash).
Fourth, in relation to the high urban regions, those have between 85 and 95% of urban
population. As may be expected, all those regions belong to the Coastal geographical division:
Moquegua, Tacna, Arequipa, Ica, and Tumbes. The high urban regions are relevant because most
of the early votes before the 1979 Constitution came from those areas.
Finally, there are only two regions that belong to the very high urban category, which
have a percentage that goes above 95% urban. In both cases, there is Lima and Callao. Both
regions have vital importance because many of the traditional parties were mainly Lima-centered,
the party elites lived in Lima, and most of the voting population at the beginning of the Republic
was from Lima. It is also relevant to mention that one-third of Peru’s 23 million population lives
in Lima. Hence, what happens in Lima is relevant when analyzing Peruvian politics.
Moving on, the second variable is political parties. The level of urbanization in
participatory, electoral ways (y variable), depends on the political party (x variable). In general

38

The shores, seas, and oceans have been identified as large environmental scenes with great importance for humanity
(Robert, 2019, p.7). The sea, which is highly valued in contemporary societies, is therefore the determining factor in
the originality of coastal urban systems and coastal urbanization (Robert, 2019, p.15).
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terms, most traditional and conservative parties tend to receive their votes from the urban sector,
and most proto-parties and left-wing groups gain their votes from a predominantly rural sector.
There are two main categories in every party: most voted regions, and least voted regions.
The three main and three least voted regions in relation to the number of votes were placed in
each category. Afterward, all rural and very high urban regions were added to the list.39 Other
regions were also added and placed in their respective categories. Eventually, after summing up
and dividing all percentages, a definitive result was obtained for each urbanization category.
Furthermore, the category with the most percentage result was highlighted, as a way to know if
the party was mainly urban-oriented or rural-oriented.
During the calculation process, accuracy was of the utmost importance. Specifically, with
parties that occupied the first places in presidential elections, more regions were added to
calculations for greater accuracy. After having all the numbers, the results were inserted on a
specific year table, with two rows of variables: urbanization category and political party. By
doing this, the average result of every urbanization category per party was clearly visible. There
are six tables in total, one for each election period from 2001 until 2021.40

39

If they were not there yet, the four rural regions (Apurímac, Huancavelica, Amazonas, and Cajamarca) and the two
very high urban regions (Lima and Callao) were added. In all elections and all parties, it was a requirement to have all
those six regions in the calculation, so that a more accurate representation of the voting population could be present.
40
The URL link to all calculations are in one citation (Chávez Linares, 2021) in References.
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In Table 3, PP is in first place, with a rural vote majority of 39.55%, and a semi-urban
vote of 47.63%. APRA has an urban majority in all respects, being around 30% of the votes in
both urban and high urban categories. PPC seems to be exactly in neither position with votes at
the same rate in both urban and rural, and surrounding 20% of the votes for each category.

In Table 4, the same pattern can be observed. UP, whose rural and semi-urban votes
surpass 40%, ended up in first place during the first presidential round. In relation to APRA, it
remains a highly urbanized party (with 41.16% in urban, and 16.80% in rural). Similarly, PPC is
very highly urban (32.25% of votes), and less rural (11.72%). Even though these two traditional
parties are mainly urban at this election, they still have a decent vote percentage, with 24.50%
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(APRA) and 11.70% (PPC). An exception would be made with AP, as it only gained 5.75% of
the total vote, which makes its urbanization calculation difficult for this specific election.

In Table 5, the same pattern is repeated. Alianza Gana Perú, with proto-parties from the
left, and with a majority rural vote (rural, 44.83%, semi-urban, 61.24%) and low urban vote (very
high urban, 21.38%), ended up in first place. On the other hand, traditional parties still remain
urban and low in voting. PPC remains very high urban (27.75%, 5.55% rural), while AP is just
average urban (24.64%). APRA did not participate in this election.

In Table 6, the same pattern continues. Frente Amplio, with a rural majority (rural
33.90%, semi-urban 42.01%), is among the first places and has low urban vote (11.64% in the
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very high urban category). In relation to traditional parties, they have less than 10% of the vote,
with an urban majority and a rural minority. AP gets 8.32% in high urban and 4.41% in rural,
while Alianza Popular (APRA+PPC) gets 7.29% of the urban vote, and 2.58% of the rural vote.

In Table 7, with the right extremely divided, a huge victory for PL can be witnessed. This
party has a great average majority of rural (44.65%) and semi-urban (43.80%) votes, while
having a low urban percentage (urban 18.45%, very high urban 7.13%). All other parties show an
average of around 10% number of votes per urbanization rate. Only two traditional parties
appear: PPC and AP. While PPC is still an urban party, AP seems to shift from urban to rural. Its
highest percentage is 13.46% in semi-urban, and its lowest is very high urban, with 6.74%.
It could be implied that most urban votes were directed towards other right-wing parties,
such as Fujimorismo, Avanza País, and RP (instead of AP). Effectively, all those three parties
show very high urban votes surpassing 10% of the electorate. Either way, at this point in time,
there is consistency on how left-wing and proto-parties, with a rural majority, tempt to win
elections and gain political power. Similarly, traditional and conservative parties, with the urban
majority, tend to decrease in power and number of votes through time.
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Conclusions and Synthesis
In conclusion, Peruvian democracy is in danger because the political parties are an almost
pure form of candidate-centered politics,they are not properly organized, and have been
controlled by self-interested individuals. The poor amount of democratic experience in the Latin
American population is a crucial factor that explains the parties’ lack of organization and
strength. Another factor is the constant discrimination and denial of representation exercised by
some political elites, which generated social struggles, inequalities, and brought new anti-system
options into politics. Furthermore, the lack of party discipline and politicians’ incapacity to
govern generated deep distrust and a negative image of the party system for Peruvian citizens.
Therefore, traditional parties turned into proto-parties, which generated even more chaos
in the political arena. Proto-parties generally gain more votes than traditional parties, but they are
short-lived, and always get replaced by new parties of the same nature. Because there are many
personalistic vehicles that get created at every election, there are always new options for voters,
who many times do not know what to expect, and choose a newly formed party because they
think it will bring some type of change or reform in the country.
In relation to some solutions or ideas that could help alleviate the situation, parties should
come together and avoid personalism by aspiring to reach higher goals instead of just competing
for the presidency. This cut on multipartidismo is crucial because “a smaller number of parties
limits fragmentation and creates predictability for votes.” (Rosenbluth, & Shapiro, 2018, p.250).
For example, the last 2021 election, if four or five parties have basically the same ideology and
political stance, they should, instead of forming coalitions, combine themselves as just one party.
When talking about research limitations, the urbanization data by region just provides
information from 2001 to 2021, meaning that there was no possibility of finding votes per region
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from 1980-1995. Secondly, in the historical chronology between 1821 to 1980, general
information such as military regimes and social inequalities are mentioned, but there are many
more events that affected party development and democracy during that long period of time.
With this in mind, future research could be related to the origins of Peruvian democracy,
with a narrow focus on the 19th century and the first years of independence. Furthermore, a
deeper study on the urban-rural conflict in Peru’s party development could be another topic to
explore. Based on the tables produced, it would be interesting to know how the country’s
regional landscape really affects parties and political life in general.
Similarly, another research topic could be based on the conditions that allow democracy
to flourish or collapse. In this paper, the discussion is mainly about Peruvian party politics from
1980 to 2021, but it would be interesting to do research merely on democratization from the first
decades of the 20th century up to 1980. By doing this, there would be an opportunity to explore
in more depth the relationship between military men and the democratic process.
Finally, more studies could be developed in relation to the country’s democratic
projection. After analyzing these last 40 years of party development, some scholars could
formulate a hypothesis of what could happen with Peruvian democracy in the near future. More
than mere speculations or scientific theories, the Peruvian case could also serve as a model or
useful resource for studying and predicting current political events around the world.
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